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The Use and Abuse
of the *Historical, plain* method
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INTRODUCTION

What is the theory of empiricism? Since the term "empiricism" has been used in a variety of ways, it is difficult to say exactly what the theory is. The *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* says that

[e]mpiricism is the theory that experience rather than reason is the source of knowledge, and in this sense it is opposed to rationalism. This general thesis, however, can receive different emphases and refinements; hence, those philosophers who have been labelled empiricists are united only in their general tendency and may differ in various ways.¹

If empiricists are united only by the fact that they agree that experience rather than reason is the source of knowledge, is it possible to determine what kind of empiricism is the most suitable to act as a representative of "true empiricism"? I think this would be quite a difficult, even impossible,

task, as the term has changed meanings over the course of the years. After Kant the mind was considered active, which makes contemporary empiricism quite different from that of the classical empiricists. The *Encyclopédia* gives some of the different senses in which empiricism has been taken and, even in the few examples listed here, one can see variance:

- 1) we learn by using the senses
- 2) sensations/feelings are experiences, i.e. we have sense experiences
- 3) all knowledge comes from experience (and when taken to an extreme this could mean that no source other than experience provides knowledge at all)
- 4) all the materials for knowledge come from experience ²

Some of these definitions imply a passive mind, while others suggest an active mind; and the third definition could submit the axioms of pure mathematics to experience. I also question the two perspectives, the subjective and the objective, in which these definitions can be taken. When we say that sensations or feelings are experiences, we are using a subjective viewpoint, while it is objective to say that all knowledge, or all the materials for knowledge, come from experience; it is a move from the "world of my experience" to "knowledge comes from the experienced world". These are the kinds of changes that confuse the meaning of empiricism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which three philosophers *specifically labelled empiricists*, i.e. John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, use empiricism in their philosophies. Which of the three is most faithful to the *historical, plain* method? And, judging from their varying dedication to the method, do Locke, Berkeley and Hume all *deserve* to be called empiricists? Through the course of this paper I hope it will become apparent that it was a mistake to group them all together under the same label. I have found that the primary uniting factor between them is the *historical, plain* method, and that, whether explicitly or implicitly, they are all guided to

some degree by the method. However, they each use and, as I will show, abuse the method in distinct fashions. The empiricist is said to reject rationalism, and yet I find some cases in which rationalism is exalted. Therefore, each philosopher treats empiricism differently and dedication to the method varies.

Locke's *historical, plain* method is founded on the belief that all our knowledge ultimately derives itself from experience, and its purpose is to establish certainty of knowledge and belief by way of retrospection: the safest way to establish the evidence for one's own belief is to look back to the source of one's own ideas. Classical empiricism differs from contemporary because Locke, Berkeley and Hume took for granted the Cartesian belief that the mind and its "furniture" are indubitable, whereas the rest of our beliefs are subject to doubt and uncertainty. When discussing experience, Berkeley tells us that "[L]anguage and knowledge are all about ideas, words stand for nothing else", ³ that there is "[n]o reasoning about things whereof we have no idea." ⁴ Hume informs us that all our ideas are copied from our impressions, and that "all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment." ⁵

Locke, Berkeley and Hume all wanted to free man from fruitless speculation. The empiricists were much attracted by the rise of the experimental sciences and the use of inductive as opposed to deductive reasoning, and they considered these advances to be superior in precision and certainty to any method of speculation. However, in their fight against speculation the empiricists failed to give a complete account of the nature of knowledge; while the empirical sciences were being exalted, the demonstrative sciences were unwisely linked with sense perception and, as a result, were deprived of their ideal exactitude. Berkeley shows great hostility toward pure mathematics:

Ridiculous in the Mathematicians to despise sense. ⁶

The Mathematicians think there are insensible lines . . . we Irish men can conceive no such lines. ⁷

I'll not admire the Mathematicians . . . I am but one of common sense ⁸

Locke rejects syllogism as the proper instrument of reason and the most useful way of reasoning. In the *Enquiry* Hume refers to syllogistic reasoning as "pretended and useless", and in the *Treatise* he says, "Our scholastic headpieces and logicians shew no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability, as to give us any inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgement, in philosophy."⁹ (Please note that the argument I give here on Hume's account of mathematics is based largely on the *Enquiry*. The treatment of mathematics in the *Treatise* is different, because he did at one time think that the *a priori* nature of mathematics might provide a support to the *a priori* notions of metaphysics.)

The main difficulty that arose due to the theory of empiricism that Locke, Berkeley and Hume all generally shared, was the problem of accounting for the derivation of non-sensory concepts. The theory that all ideas are of "sensible qualities", such as Berkeley's, or Hume's belief that an idea can only be understood when traced back to its original impression, made a puzzle out of other theories like the existence of God or matter, or the numbers and relations which are not used to ascribe qualities. Either mathematical and logical concepts receive a higher status than that of sensory data, or we have to force all non-sensory concepts into the same category with the data of the senses. Either mathematical and logical statements are of a different nature than the statements which cover matters of fact, or all statements must be the reports of experience. As I will show, this is a fundamental problem for the classical empiricists. They run up against such difficulties as whether the *historical, plain* method can lead us to understand the meaning of mathematical entities or not without violating the principle that language and knowledge are all about ideas and ideas are of "sensible qualities"; and whether there is the possibility of self-evident propositions. These and similar problems cause the classical empiricists, in differing degrees, to stray from their dedication to the *historical, plain* method.

Chapter I

It is Locke's purpose to "inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of *human knowledge*," together with the grounds and degrees of *belief, opinion, and assent*."¹ He wants to determine what we know, how we come to know it, and the degrees of certainty that we can reach. There are different kinds of knowledge and a varying number of degrees of confidence such as doubting, opinionating and hoping. It is Locke's intention to determine what kinds of knowledge can be considered, and what fall short of, certainty.

According to Locke, no form of knowledge is worthy unless the speaker is justifiably certain of what he says; knowledge that does not stand up to all opposition is belief, faith or opinion. The nature of knowing, however, is a problem: Locke wants man to stay within the bounds of the mind's capacity for otherwise he will speculate beyond its limits. The human brain is equipped for science (observing, experimenting, and measuring), factual material (consulting and comparing), and logic (calculating and reasoning). The hardest kinds of knowledge to deal with are the religious, moral, and philosophical, for there is no universally accepted standard on which to base them; such knowledge is beyond man's understanding and he is destined to fail if he expects

to handle it as he would concrete material. Locke's *historical, plain* method, therefore, is his examination of the mind's functions and objects, abilities and limits; the method is designed to "give [an] account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have . . ." ² Locke wants to figure out the following:

- 1) What are the ways we come to know or believe? How do sense perception, memory and reasoning fit into the origins of knowing?
- 2) What can we know? What about ideas? Concepts?
- 3) What different types of statements are there? When are they considered certain and when probable?

Man's knowledge seems to fall into three fields. First, Locke believes man has a knowledge of things as they are in their own way--their constitutions, properties, and operations; this is knowledge of the natural sciences and it extends to all bodies physical and spiritual, including God and angels. ³ Another field is moral knowledge, that which man ought to have as a rational being for the attainment of any end, especially happiness. Logic (the doctrine of signs) is the study of the ways one can attain and communicate through the use of ideas and words the aforementioned kinds of knowledge.

These three fields of knowledge constitute in very general terms what man can know. Experience is a succession of events and the basis from which all knowledge grows. Man can take knowledge from experience and use his power of reason to combine simple ideas into complex ones; but the above is all there is to work with; one cannot expand beyond the capacities of the mind; there is no knowledge outside experience. The following passage summarizes Locke's empiricism:

All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may

seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which *sense* and *reflection* have offered for its contemplation.⁴

Experience provides all the materials for knowledge: anything that is not perceived by the senses cannot be known by the mind. The two sources of knowledge are sensation and reflection. Sensations occur when external objects affect the sense organs and the senses "convey"⁵ into the mind what produces perceptions there. We have ideas of yellow and cold (secondary qualities of objects) as well as ideas of form, extension, and motion (primary qualities of objects). Reflection is equivalent to introspection: it is the notice the mind takes of its own operations. The mind can take the raw materials (simple ideas) it receives from either of these two sources and form complex ideas. But, "[I] . . . desire any one to assign any *simple idea* which is not received from one of those inlets before mentioned, or any *complex idea* not made out of those simple ones"⁶: no human mind can invent or frame simple ideas.

"Idea" is a key word for Locke. Upon receiving an impression from sensation or reflection, the mind begins to think, i.e., compare/contrast the impression with ideas already in the mind, judge the impression, combine it with other ideas, etc.; ideas are the objects of the understanding. The word "idea" is used in different ways and given different functions: Locke thought that every idea had a common function--be it a phantasm, a notion, a desire etc.--and that was to serve as a sign representing to the mind objects with which it (the mind) could never become directly acquainted. Locke's different uses of the word "idea" are as follows:

- 1) Sense-datum/contents of sense experience
- 2) Simple and complex ideas of substances
- 3) Images (memory /imagination)
- 4) Concepts of general meanings--any idea that is not restricted

to any particular sense quality, e. g. motion, sweetness etc.

- 5) The act of perception /introspection--we cannot know some thing without being conscious that we do: anything, be it act or object, of which we are conscious, is an idea.

Locke says we can only know the world through our mind's ideas. But, what does it mean to exist in the mind? And if all we can know are ideas, can we really ever know the world? Locke did not go to any great extent to answer either of the above questions. He saw that the latter was a problem and attempted to solve it by suggesting that knowledge can be called real if it conforms with the reality of things.⁷ However, this was a problem he could not overcome since the mind knows, and can only know, its own ideas. As for the former question, he never attempted an answer.

I believe that some of Locke's ideas are misnamed "simple ideas". He does say that anything that is in the mind is an idea, but he needs to be clearer about his meanings. Locke should have made a distinction between what he calls "ideas of pleasure and pain",⁸ the simple ideas of both sensation and reflection, and those simple ideas which are impressed upon the mind from without. Simple ideas of sensation are those that help us identify the external objects of perception. But Locke's simple ideas of reflection--pain and pleasure--are different in nature and origin, and therefore need another name to distinguish them. Again, Locke speaks of the "[s]imple ideas [of perception and willing that] are the operations of the mind about its other ideas."⁹ For Locke, perception is the first simple idea of reflection. Yet, how can one have an *idea* of a perception? I have a feeling or notion that my mind operates around its ideas constantly, but I do not have an "idea", *per se*, of perception like I have an idea of a book or a tree. And Locke does not seem to have any idea either. Indeed, he has no definition of perception: "What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it."¹⁰ I believe that the ideas of perception and willing are best named powers, for the word "idea" implies cognitive understanding. Locke again appears vague in his definition of solidity. Instead of defining it he sends man to his senses to inform him; and "[i]f he thinks this not a sufficient

explication of solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what extension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier."¹¹ Locke never does explain what solidity is; his only hope is to escape the problem gracefully.

Locke says a man cannot have innate knowledge but only the powers by which to obtain knowledge upon birth. Locke divides into two classes the principles upon which many men base the theory of innate knowledge:

- 1) Speculative principles (self-evident/logical propositions): whatever is, is; it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.¹²
- 2) Rules of practicality and morality: common notions concerning certain principles; what men agree to be, is.¹³

Locke uses these two classes to argue against innate knowledge. There might be such a thing as innate ideas if it were not possible to know them through experience or any other way, he argues; however, men are so diverse in their views that they cannot all agree on any one subject, and so both innate knowledge and universal consent are out, and one must accept experience alone as the foundation for knowledge. Also, principles cannot be in the mind at birth and later on come to be known when the mind is developed, because to be in the mind means to be in the understanding, hence understood, and nothing can be printed on the understanding without first being perceived. Innate ideas have to prove themselves; man cannot sit down and try to prove the hypothesis of innate ideas, for explanation would make the hypothesis superfluous. Fools and children do not know about innate principles, and yet to be innate everyone must know them. Concerning justice and other morals, people do not really follow innate ideas but rather assent to rules and practices they discover in daily life. Man, therefore, lives by natural tendencies and not innate ideas.

Locke does not realize it but he does agree that men have *a priori* ideas of a sort upon or prior to birth. As Locke says himself, these *a priori* ideas--the simple ideas of pleasure and pain

that act as motives for our actions--only have application on the precondition that there is experience. "[God] has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations, and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another." ¹⁴ It seems to me that the ideas of pain and pleasure must be in the mind *before* we can experience the external world and learn by it. Also, we could not have received the ideas of pleasure and pain from without, as they are not qualities of any sensible object. How and when do the ideas of pleasure and pain enter the mind? It may be that Locke has an inconsistency here that he did not notice. He never tells us when God gives man the ideas of pain and pleasure, and, for that matter, he also never clarifies the point at which the mind is a *tabula rasa*; it is only said that the mind begins to develop, or "fill its blank tablet", at the moment sensation begins. Locke first explains how the *tabula rasa* is devoid of all ideas, and yet he later says a man cannot learn without the aid of his ideas of pleasure and pain (and experience) to guide him. The point at which God operates on man, however, is too vague.

Simple ideas are divided into four classes. In sensation ideas can be obtained by one sense only, or by multiple senses; and perception or thinking, and willing or volition are the two subgroups of reflection that give rise to simple ideas. Other ideas, such as pain or delight, accompany simple ideas and aid man in his choices for further action. Locke goes on to combine simple ideas to form complex ones; beauty, an army, the universe, etc., are examples. He classifies complex ideas in terms of objects: the comparison of simple or complex ideas with one another is an example of *ideas of relation*; commonly recurring groups of similar sense-data are the origin of the *ideas of substance*; and *modes* depend on, or are affections of, substances. Locke's simple modes include space, duration, number, infinity, modes of motion and sound, color, taste, and smell. Thus, to run, leap, crawl, roll, dance, etc., are all different modes of motion; and blue and yellow are modes of color. Mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of several kinds: beauty, for example, consists of a certain composition of color and figure, and causes delight in the beholder.

Concerning ideas and qualities, a snowball has the power to produce in man the ideas of white and cold. These powers are some of the secondary qualities of the snowball. The primary

powers--solidity, extension, figure, and mobility, unlike secondary qualities, are inseparable from a body. And the tertiary power of a body (which is parallel to its secondary qualities) is its capacity to produce not ideas in us, but changes of bulk, figure, motion and texture in other bodies. The sun, for example, has the active power to melt wax, while the wax has the passive power to be melted by the sun. It is a mistake on Locke's part, however, to arrange the secondary qualities in the way he does. He groups together such qualities as cold, heat, color, taste, sound, etc., with the ideas of pain, pleasure and sickness.¹⁵ He says that none of these are actually in the objects themselves but are powers in the bodies to produce in man certain sensations. And yet, there is something to be said about heat as opposed to pain. Pain is most obviously something felt by an intelligible being and therefore the idea of pain can affect only a mind. But, coldness, color, and so on, are not as easily dismissed from the presence of bodies. Although philosophy will argue against it, common sense and experience do suggest strongly to man that the qualities of bodies are constant and exist independent of mind. But Locke prefers to make all the secondary qualities of bodies--pain and pleasure as well as color and heat--as varied and unpredictable as the mind: "[L]et not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; . . . [and] . . . *as they are such particular ideas* , vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure and motion of parts."¹⁶

"Collections of simple ideas"¹⁷ refers to substance. When we observe through experience that a certain group of similar sense-data commonly recur, we suppose there is a substance behind these qualities, supporting them. Locke discusses the origin of our idea of substance here. In his view, the custom of supposing some support for qualities is a justifiable inference--but it is still an inference:

[A man] who, whatever *substantial forms* he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them . . .¹⁸

By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the

idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.¹⁹

We do not perceive substances; we infer them as the support of qualities and/or modes because we cannot conceive them as subsisting alone. We come to form a general idea of substance through supposition of it: it is believed to be that which supports primary qualities and possesses the power of causing simple ideas in us. Locke does not want to go to the extreme of swearing certainty to substance's existence, but he also does not want to say substance is a mere figment of the imagination.

Our distinct ideas of particular substances are several combinations of simple ideas obtained through sensation and reflection. A rose, for example, has the qualities of being red, sweet, and soft to the touch. Together these qualities form a complex idea of a particular substance, the rose. Our idea of spiritual substance or soul is obtained through combining simple ideas of thinking, willing, doubting, etc., which themselves are obtained by reflection. "And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material."²⁰ To form an idea of God we enlarge to infinity those qualities of goodness, intelligence, mercy etc., and we combine them to form our complex idea: "[T]he invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."²¹ God Himself is a simple idea: but our idea of Him is a complex one.

As we can see, Locke finds it equally difficult to form an idea of spiritual substance as he does matter. He knows we are ignorant of the presence of both God and matter, but he also realizes we cannot disprove their existence. As I will discuss later, the only alternative is to use reason and imagination to arrive at material and spiritual supports. Man knows he himself exists,

and he knows that something does not come from nothing. Therefore, it must be the Eternal Being who created him. ". . . God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt."²² And as for matter, man assumes every thing existent needs a support, including the qualities of bodies. Reason and imagination again aid him in the formation of his ideas: "The now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts."²³ What does Locke expect to find behind the primary and secondary qualities? He does not realize that no amount of magnification will reveal matter, but rather only more secondary qualities. Locke thinks that there must be some point at which matter is discoverable to the senses and inference becomes certainty. This quest, however, can never be fulfilled.

Ideas of primary and secondary qualities or powers, passive and active, are our distinct ideas of corporeal substances. Most of the simple ideas that compose ideas are only powers. Gold, for example, is to us a combination of yellowness, fusibility and solubility, which are the active and passive powers of the gold. It is characteristic of man to take the particular qualities of substance and form general ideas of them through abstraction. Abstraction is done when one separates an idea "from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas",²⁴ and the result is a novel idea. When obtaining a general idea of substance, however, one does not use sensation or reflection, combine simple ideas, or abstract in the sense above; it is rather a matter of inference. As discussed earlier, Locke realizes man can only infer the existence of substance, and yet the philosopher chooses to call substance an "idea"²⁵ anyway. For Locke substance lies beyond experience and is unknown. The word "idea" does not really apply here and I consider it a misnomer.

What does knowledge consist of, according to Locke? "Knowledge . . . seems to me to be nothing but *the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas* . In this alone it consists."²⁶ The primary form of this knowledge is *identity of diversity* : I know immediately that a square is not a circle; there is agreement and disagreement

between ideas on sight. The secondary form is called *relative*: it includes the relations between the agreements and disagreements of ideas (mathematics). The tertiary form is the agreement and disagreement of *coexistence*: we know particular consequences that happen to objects because we are familiar with what powers coexist with the substance in question. And the last form of this knowledge is called the agreement and disagreement of *real existence*: God is; we know the idea of God agrees with a really existent Being.²⁷ Knowledge of "real existence" is bound to cause difficulties. If Locke defines an idea as whatever is the object of the mind when it thinks, it is not easy to see how we can ever know our ideas correspond to real existents, if real existents cannot be considered our ideas. So, knowledge for Locke must either be perceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas, or perceiving the agreement and disagreement between ideas (things) which are not our ideas.

Judging from the amount of certainty one can expect in different kinds of knowledge, Locke is able to establish three *degrees*, or differences in clearness, of our knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is immediate and unquestionable certainty:

For in this [kind of knowledge] the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that *white* is not *black*, that a *circle* is not a *triangle*, that *three* are more than *two* and equal to *one and two*. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea . . . *It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge.* ²⁸

The next degree of knowledge is demonstrative knowledge, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Reason must step in for the mind to choose and employ the proper intervening ideas. Although Locke tells us that all ideas come from

sensation and reflection, or experience, he uses mathematical reasoning to prove and to demonstrate propositions: "Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two others, are called *proofs* . . ." ²⁹ Demonstrative knowledge does lack the clarity of intuition, but "every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty." ³⁰ And whatever falls short of intuition and demonstration is not knowledge but faith or opinion.

The last degree of knowledge, sensitive knowledge, is given the least amount of certainty and extends not beyond the existence of things actually present to our senses. Sensitive knowledge--I do not mean the actual process of sensation or perception here--like demonstrative knowledge, is supported by intuitive knowledge:

There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made." ³¹

It must be that sensation and intuition work together, otherwise men would never wish to imagine that, because they have certain ideas in their minds, objects must exist outside of their perception. Locke tells us, however, that sensitive knowledge cannot give enough evidence to prove the existence of particular external objects. Sensation gives knowledge that is bare probability; it is "as great as our happiness or misery", and with that we must be content.

How far does knowledge extend? If knowledge consists in perceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas, it follows that we can have knowledge no further than we can have ideas.

But Locke claims the extent of knowledge falls short not only of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas.³² Taking another look at the four forms of knowledge, 1) the knowledge of identity and diversity extends as far as our ideas extend. 2) The knowledge of coexistence is really very little: we observe substances but cannot be said to truly know the connexions between simple ideas. Our knowledge of the necessary connexions of ideas is deficient. It is simply a knowledge based on experience. We cannot even be said to understand complex ideas of substances, since said ideas are made up of primary and secondary qualities which depend on a "something, we know not what";³³ and if we do not know the root, we cannot understand the qualities. 3) Knowledge of relations: it is difficult to say how far this knowledge extends concerning the agreement of ideas. It all depends on how intelligent man is under the circumstances to find an intermediate idea or ideas that will show the relations of ideas where coexistence is not clear or considered. And 4) concerning the knowledge of actual existence of things, we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, demonstrative knowledge of God's existence, and sensitive knowledge of the existence of external objects, which extends not beyond objects present to the senses. As for knowledge of self existence, this needs no proof and offers no doubt: I perceive that I am a thinking being.

What is the reality of knowledge? Locke says we can know things exist and we can know about them: external objects really operate on us "whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of a particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses."³⁴ But, how can we do this if the immediate objects of thought are ideas? The mind knows things by the intervention of ideas. Our knowledge is real, therefore, only so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what is this criterion? How can the mind, perceiving only its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?

Locke answers this question by showing how both mathematical knowledge and morality are true in themselves and do not depend on the empirical world to validate them. Locke realizes that the immediate objects of thought are ideas, and that it is impossible to know if knowledge conforms with reality and can be called real. His only alternative, therefore, is to show that certain

and real knowledge is attainable through mind-based truths. Mathematics is a mental fabrication and applies only to the relations between ideas, not to the world of things. The truth of math does not depend on whether man's mental image of the perfect circle exists somewhere in the world. Likewise, the truth of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men and the existences of those virtues in the world which they treat: "nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea."³⁵ Simple ideas, however, are different for they are not created by the mind but imposed from without; simple ideas must be the product of things operating on the mind and they must have conformity with things. The idea of bitterness, for example, as it is in the mind, corresponds exactly to the power which is in the body that produced it.

Locke is guilty of being a rationalist, and his exaltation of the certainty of mathematics and morality is just one of his downfalls as an empiricist. There are a number cases in which Locke fails to stand by his *historical, plain* method. Although he begins a strong believer in empiricism, Locke allows a surprising amount of rationalistic elements to sway his thought. For example, suggestions of this appear when Locke tells us quite confidently that there is no idea we more steadily perceive than solidity. However, upon being asked to define that which is "received so constantly from sensation", he cannot do so and has to use a wordgame to bypass the problem. Also, existence is an idea that is suggested to the understanding by every object without, and every idea within: "When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us;--which is, that they exist, or have existence."³⁶ In other words, we simply *know* that things exist and there is no doubt. Locke can give no further explanation of existence than that it is something we know without question. And, unity, power, and succession are suggested by our senses but are much more constantly offered by the operations of the mind.

It is intuition, however, that is largely responsible for the rationalistic elements in Locke's philosophy. Locke tells us, for example, that we have demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God, that by taking the ideas of thinking and willing and adding them to substance, we arrive at the

idea of God. Locke says that it is reason that tells us God is most powerful and most knowing. However, I tend to believe that the demonstrative knowledge of God's existence arises from an intuitive certainty, upon which man's powers of imagining and reasoning can grow. And I believe this because Locke says it is intuition that tells me something does not come from nothing; I exist and I must come from something, hence God. Therefore, it is demonstration that helps me understand God and my own existence, but it is a demonstration based on intuition. This is further affirmed by the amount of unquestionable certainty Locke grants God's existence. Unlike the typical demonstrative knowledge of the agreement and disagreement of ideas and the possibility of doubt that might be present in any kind of knowledge that is not immediate, Locke gives God so much certainty that The Eternal Being is as certain as moral and mathematical truths, both of which are intuitively certain.

We recall that the external world is the foundation of all the simple ideas of our knowledge, and that it is when sensation begins that we first have any knowledge. Real knowledge, Locke tells us, is the conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things. We can have real knowledge of books and trees, if both correspond objects to ideas. Our faculties do not deceive concerning that which we presently sense. Anything out of direct observation cannot be proved to exist and must be faith or opinion. Sensitive knowledge, therefore, cannot extend further than immediate experience; Locke says it is little more than bare probability but it is still knowledge. Although this last point seems to negate the validity of any sensitive knowledge at all, Locke is still staying true to the *historical, plain* method here. However, it is when he begins to abstract matter that I give him up for a rationalist. At one point Locke tells us that we have knowledge no further than we have ideas, and by "ideas" one would suppose that he means mental images that originate from the simple ideas of experience. And yet Locke goes beyond the *historical, plain* method when he abstracts substance. Sensation cannot prove the existence of something that is outside the realm of perception; there is nothing in experience that can give us an idea of matter. Locke realizes that matter is only a supposition, but makes his mistake when he tries to use sensation to abstract matter. In this case he is not using sensation but rather demonstration. To come up with the notion of matter, he abstracts the ideas of coherent solid parts and combines them with the abstracted

powers of being moved and the idea of substance, and the end result is matter. Sensation is reduced to demonstration, i.e. what cannot be actually sensed is explained by way of a demonstrative argument, and another rational element is added to Locke's philosophy. I did question whether or not Locke was reducing sensation to intuition, but found that matter is not known immediately and without some process of reasoning.

A last point to be added is that when Locke says that "reason must be our last judge and guide in everything", ³⁷ I take this to mean that he does realize his rational tendencies are quite strong. In this passage he is saying that faith must be regulated by reason; but the above quotation serves to sum up his philosophy for me.

Chapter II

George Berkeley takes quite a different approach to empiricism and the *historical, plain* method, as we shall soon see. Like Locke, he believes that the mind is a *tabula rasa* upon birth, that there is an external world--although it is of a different nature than the world of Locke, and that all our ideas come from sensation and reflection. But here the similarities between the two philosophers end. Berkeley goes on to reject Locke's abstraction, his supposition of matter and the existence of bodies independent of mind, and his exaltation of mathematics and natural philosophy. These changes Berkeley brings to the empiricism of his time show that he wishes to be truer to the *historical, plain* method than Locke. Berkeley has a great respect for Locke, but his respect is also accompanied by much criticism. In the *Philosophical Commentaries* he remarks that Locke would have done better to begin his *Essay* with the third book.¹ In other words, if Locke had begun with an examination of language, its functions and meanings, he might not have fallen into the theory of abstract ideas. Abstraction, according to Berkeley, is responsible for the problem of material substance, and many other things.

Berkeley's aim is to begin with a critique of language. Language is at the basis of many

problems because it is language that communicates ideas. Therefore, in order to understand Berkeley's doctrine of knowledge one must first talk of the nature and abuse of language. Language does have other uses besides the communication of ideas, such as "the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition . . ." ² In his general remarks on language, Berkeley discusses abstract general ideas, what he considers to be the great downfall of mankind for which language is chiefly responsible. There is no such thing as an abstract idea, says he, though there can be a sort of general idea. "[I]t is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any *abstract* general ideas . . ." ³ Further, he discusses the problems one faces when trying to form abstract general images of e.g., a triangle. It is impossible to frame an image of a triangle which includes all the characteristics of different types of triangles and which at the same time is not itself any particular triangle:

What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is " 'neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.' " ⁴

This is taken from Locke who speaks of forming the general idea of a triangle. Locke also speaks of ideas becoming general by separation from all that customarily surrounds them. Through this method of abstraction they come to represent more individuals than one. For example, the general image of a man contains all characteristics common to all men and omits those that are different. Again, Berkeley refuses this theory, saying instead that "the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed . . ." ⁵ In other words, all the mind can know are particulars, and it is impossible for it to consider any quality singly or abstracted from the other qualities with which it is united.

Berkeley uses this same argument when he proves that mathematics and natural philosophy, two doctrines that the rationalist promises are unquestionably certain, really carry no more truth in

them than anything else. Time, place and motion are said to exist without the mind, according to the natural scientist. But Berkeley finds that "absolute space, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible."⁶ It is impossible to abstract space from its empirical surroundings. If there is no body, there can be no space and motion. Unity is another abstract idea. Berkeley finds that man even tries to abstract human conditions like happiness and goodness from their particular situations, and this he considers to be quite absurd.

Mathematics cannot be supposed free of mistakes either. Berkeley argues that number is a creature of mind entirely. Theorems are deduced from a great height of evidence, yet

. . . their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity; and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them . . . To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. ⁷

There are no ideas of numbers in abstract, denoted by numerals and figures; we cannot signify abstract ideas by numbers or characters when they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. Therefore, although mathematical principles are true and the way of deducing from these principles is clear and uncontested, there is still a certain amount of error to be found in fundamental maxims.

Geometry is no less at fault, as it holds extension as its main object. Theorems and demonstrations in geometry are conversant about universal ideas: particular lines or figures are said to stand for other similar ones. Also, man speaks of lines as though they contained parts which they really do not: "There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch."⁸ The inch-line is said to

contain parts more than any assignable number--but this is true only for the things signified by it, and not of the inch taken absolutely. There are no such things as infinitisimals of infinitisimals of infinitisimals etc. I cannot resolve any one of my ideas of extension into an infinite number of other ideas.

Thus Berkeley is able to successfully refute the rationalist tendency to exalt mathematics and natural philosophy. Yet, although Berkeley denies abstract general ideas, he does not deny general ideas completely. He believes that an idea, which considered by itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent all other particular ideas like it. Thus universality does not consist "in the absolute, *positive* nature or conception of anything, but in the *relation* it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it . . ." ⁹ If there are no abstract general ideas it follows that reasoning must be about particulars. The universal scope of reasoning is made possible by the power to make a particular idea universal. Berkeley does not deny the possibility of general words but he does reject the theory that general words can denote general ideas, if we mean by this ideas which possess a positive universal content. The universality of a word is merely functional. Once we understand this we are saved from hunting for mysterious entities that correspond to general words. Material substance does not denote any abstract general idea, and we are misled by words if we think some entity called material substance exists apart from our realm of perception. Berkeley attacks Locke's theory of material substance. Matter is not a name in the way that "tree" or "book" is a name.

Berkeley theorizes that sensory objects have no absolute existence of their own apart from being perceived. "The table I write on I say exists--that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it." ¹⁰ Berkeley challenges the reader to find any other meaning for the proposition "the table exists/is" than "the table is perceived or perceptible." Any man might agree that the table exists while no one is in the room, but this only means that if he enters the room he will perceive a table. Even if he tries to imagine the table existing apart from anybody's perception, he necessarily imagines himself or someone else perceiving it. Berkeley says, therefore, that "the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being

perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."¹¹

So, to exist implies to be perceived. But, we cannot say that the existence of the book on the table depends on its being perceived by man. If the book is on the table, then anyone who enters the room will perceive a book on a table. That is not to say, however, that the book exists because it is perceived by man, as this would be to disregard Berkeley's God as a universal and omnipresent perceiver.

All sensible things are ideas or collections of ideas and cannot exist without a mind perceiving them. To perceive is to have an idea. When we perceive colors we are perceiving ideas. And, as these ideas come from without, they are sensations. "All significant words stand for ideas. All knowledge [is] about our ideas. All ideas come from without or from within. If from without it must be by the senses and they are called sensations. If from within they are the operations of the mind and are called thoughts." But, "[n]o sensation can be in a senseless thing."¹² And it is a contradiction that anything should exist without the mind unperceived. To be perceived implies dependence on a perceiver, and to exist means either to perceive or to be perceived. The object of perception is an idea. Ideas do not resemble any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived. An idea is like nothing but an idea.¹³ Berkeley realizes it is natural for men to believe that things as collections of ideas or sensations exist outside the perceiving mind, and he considers this a strange opinion that prevails among men. This notion "will perhaps be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?"¹⁴

What is the jurisdiction for calling sensible things ideas? One line of argument of Berkeley is to call people back from distinguishing secondary qualities (color, sound, taste etc.) from primary qualities (extension, figure, and so on), saying the former are totally mind dependent while the latter exist in an unthinking substance. "By *matter*, therefore, we are to understand an inert,

senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist."¹⁵ He rejects this belief because it is impossible to conceive primary apart from secondary qualities. "[E]xtension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable."¹⁶ Both primary and secondary qualities are ideas and being ideas they cannot exist in an unthinking substance. Therefore, it is found that Berkeley is successful when refuting Locke's doctrine of material substance, and sensible things become collections of ideas.

Berkeley wants to be sure we realize that calling sensible things ideas is not to rob them of their reality. "Say you, at this rate all's nothing but idea, mere phantasm. I answer every thing [is] as real as ever. I hope that to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing and not mentioned the word Idea were it not for a reason, and I think it a good one too . . . "¹⁷ Whatever we see, feel, hear etc., is as real as ever. "There is a *rerum natura*, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force."¹⁸

But, if sensible things are ideas, does that mean we are eating, drinking and clothing ourselves with ideas? Berkeley agrees this way of speaking does sound "very harsh",¹⁹ and understandably so, since "idea" is not normally used for the things we see and touch. We need only understand the words and in what context they are being used. Berkeley uses "idea" because "thing" denotes existence without the mind. As Berkeley uses "ideas" to refer to the immediate objects of sense-perception, he can say his theory of ideas makes no difference to the reality of the sensible world. And, whether or not there is such a thing as matter is unimportant, for we cannot perceive it anyway.

Berkeley uses the word "idea" in different ways. He uses it to signify what we perceive, that is, sensible objects. This is the technical use,--sensible things named ideas are not reduced to ideas in the ordinary fashion. But Berkeley also speaks of "sensations or ideas"²⁰ as though the terms were synonymous. "Sensations" means something private, subjective modifications of the mind. So, according to this, there is no real public sensible world but rather many private worlds. The sensible world becomes something like a dream world.

Here we need to introduce Berkeley's distinction between ideas and images of things. Ideas or sensible things are "imprinted on the senses by the Author of nature."²¹ They are called "real things". I do not choose to see the piece of paper before me when I open my eyes, although I might have control over where I direct my eyesight. Berkeley compares the sphere of sensible reality to the sphere of images. The piece of white paper, a collection of ideas, does not depend on a finite mind for existence in the same way that an image of a unicorn does. Berkeley insists there is an order of nature, a coherent pattern of ideas which does not depend on finite minds. Ideas of imagination depend on a finite mind while ideas of reality depend on an infinite one.

Sensible things are ideas and can only exist in minds or spirits. Spirits, therefore, are the only kinds of substance there are. Ideas are passive and inert. Both ideas and spirits are *things* per se, but one is active and indivisible while the other is inert, dependent and fleeting. Spirits cannot be or be like ideas. This would be absurd. Spirits perceive ideas (use of understanding) and produce and operate around ideas (use of will); however, we cannot have an idea of that which acts. We do have some notion of a soul or spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, living, hating, and so on. We can have a notion of spirit, but not an idea in the technical sense. Berkeley says we must have some kind of notion, "otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of [spirit]."²²

How do we know of the existence of finite spirits? We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. I know I exist for I perceive ideas and am aware that I am distinct from those ideas which I perceive. As for others,

. . . it is plain we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending

on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs." 23

It is natural to speak of the laws of nature. "Now the set rules or established methods wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the *laws of nature* ; and there we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things." 24 The whole system of nature is immense, beautiful and glorious; sensible ideas form coherent patterns and regular sequences which we call "laws". God imprints ideas in a regular order. Physical laws of man state that certain types of bodies attract one another, yet these are factual and not necessary connexions. We do not know that God will always behave in the same way. We may take for a miracle something that is unusual, such as X following Y instead of the other way around. We learn through experience that Y is "supposed to" follow X, but if God prefers it differently, He is not breaking any hard and fast rules. Miracles, therefore, do not interfere with necessary connexions. There is a *rerum natura* and there is an order of nature, but it is not a necessary order.

What does Berkeley consider to be the extent of man's knowledge? And how much certainty can man expect in his knowledge? Man uses his daily experiences as well as the laws of nature to aid him in his actions and provide him with knowledge. Knowledge is largely the result of the mind's own acts: if man is attentive, mentally active, and sensitive to goings-on around him, he will learn. The very basic root of all knowledge is spirit. Our knowledge of spirits, however, is quite vague, and we can only have *notions* of them. ". . . [I]deas, spirits, and relations [between ideas] are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse." 25 The term "idea" does not cover every thing we know or have a notion of. Therefore, we have notions of spirits because they are not sensible in the way that simple ideas are sensible. But knowledge of all else provides us with the greatest of certainty. Why? *Because there is nothing that exists other than what we perceive.* "That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being." 26 This provides us with a degree

and kind of certainty that Locke could never have upheld. Berkeley believes God would never deceive us, and sensations, by definition, are free from error. Error arises only in bad judgment.

Berkeley gives an empirical and phenomenalist analysis of causal relation as far as the activity of sensible things is concerned. If Y customarily follows X and without X, Y does not occur, we cannot automatically consider X to be the cause of Y. The connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect. There are two elements in Berkeley's analysis of causal relation. The empirical element is that all we observe is a regular sequence of events; and the metaphysical element is that X is a God-given sign of Y and the whole system of nature is a system of signs, a visual divine language, speaking to us about God.

Berkeley's proof of God's existence is a causal argument, based on the existence of sensible things. It is evident to everyone that those things which make up nature are not produced by or dependent on the wills of men. "To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature."²⁷ And yet, it sounds as though Berkeley's proof of the existence of God is blind to the difficulties encountered in analyzing the meaning of the terms predicated of God, especially after the philosopher was so quick to criticize material substance. After all, man does have to infer God's existence; he does not see it. In the *Dialogues* the proof of God's existence is put this way: "*Sensible things do really exist: and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God.*"²⁸ Berkeley also seems to take for granted that the system, harmony and beauty of nature show that nature is the product of an infinitely wise and perfect spirit. The blemishes and defects found in nature constitute no valid argument against this inference. However, we must understand the way in which Berkeley wants us to take the word "God". Terms such as wisdom and goodness, when predicated of God, must be taken in quite a different sense from what they signify in the vulgar acceptation, or from anything else man can conceive. According to Berkeley, it is wrong to meet objections brought against the predication of such attributes of God by denying that they are predicated in any known sense; this denial is equivalent to denying that the attributes belong to God at all, and so His being is denied. In other words, to assert that the terms predicated of God are to be understood in an equivocal sense is to

assert agnosticism; the meaning of the word "God" is reduced to nothing. Berkeley wants the terms predicated of God to be taken in their true sense. Otherwise, those qualities brought to prove His existence will conclude in nothing. On the other hand, the terms cannot be predicated in the same imperfect manner in which they are predicated of animals. So, in order to obtain a notion of God, one should reflect on his own soul, heightening its powers and removing its imperfections.

Berkeley speaks of sensible things as though they existed in our minds. God "excites those ideas in our minds" and ideas are "imprinted on the senses." This suggests a world that is constantly being recreated. The nature of perception, however, is hard to understand. I find that "to exist" can mean either to perceive or to be perceived. First, to perceive refers to the finite subject and to be perceived means to be perceived by that subject. Secondly, to perceive refers to God and to be perceived means to be perceived by Him. Berkeley attempts to reconcile these two positions by making a distinction between eternal and relative existences. "All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in his mind: but when things before imperceptible to creatures, are by a decree of God, made perceptible to them; then are they said to begin a relative existence with respect to created minds."²⁹ Sensible things, therefore, have an "archetypal and eternal" existence in the divine mind and an "ectypal or natural" existence in the finite mind.³⁰ Creation takes place when the ideas receive "ectypal" existence. And, the same sensible things which, as perceived by a finite spirit, possess natural existence possess, as perceived by God, archetypal existence. Berkeley speaks of objects eternally known by God and having an eternal existence in His mind and, upon being made perceptible to creatures, then beginning a relative existence.³¹ Berkeley wants us to know there is a sure distinction to be made between ectypal or natural and archetypal existence, because sensible things or ideas in the mind of man cannot be the same as those in the divine one.

God is substance, cause and the "place of spirits"--all depends on Him. The mundane world is God's mind, and He is the source of reality. When speaking of perception, Berkeley says man has "ideas actually imprinted on the senses"³² by God. However, this is an incorrect usage of words. Berkeley grants God so much control over man's ideas that this can only mean God imprints ideas *on the mind of man*, not on the senses. To go one step further, it makes no sense to

say ideas affect the senses, as ideas, according to Berkeley, imply passiveness and inertness, and "it is impossible for an idea to do anything."³³ To say a spirit is the cause of our ideas is not enough. It can only be that the spirit makes direct contact with us, operating directly on our senses and placing ideas into our minds. This, in turn, must mean that experience is a process of *passive reception* of ideas and very little finite action is involved. Man's "reception", takes place, for example, when he sees the sun, while the action he alone has control over is whether he wishes to turn his eyes this way or that. "A little attention will make it plain to anyone, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of *spirit*, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth."³⁴ The "effects" of spirit must now be changed to "operations" in light of the problem we have discovered. Berkeley's "ideas of sense", therefore, necessarily have no more action in them--finite action--than his "ideas of imagination" or any other sort of idea. The only reason why ideas of sense are found to be "more strong, lively and distinct"³⁵ is because they, as opposed to the finite ideas of imagination, are under direct control of the Eternal Spirit.

In Berkeley's empiricism, everything is due to Spirit. There is only Spirit, or that which perceives. Simple ideas no longer have an existence independent of a mind, finite or eternal. I believe that Berkeley's external world, because it is composed of ideas and not of some sort of independent substance, *must* be the mind of God itself. Nature is ideas, and therefore the external world is equivalent to God's mind because He created and perceives it. Nature can still be considered a kind of substance, but it is a substance that is made up only of ideas and has no existence apart from God which supports it. Therefore, ideas, and not objects, of sensation affect us. Also, as God is the root of all knowledge, and the Eternal Being that created, supports and provides for us, it is necessary that God control our experiences. There is no power in simple ideas because every thing is Spirit; therefore, it is not the sun that causes heat, but Spirit.

But, what does this do to one's notion of reality? Reality, or the external world as we know it, is forced to take on a new sense. No longer do we have complete freedom to operate and experience as we imagine: we are under the control of an omnipotent Being. "Reality" becomes both awesome and frightening when we understand that we tread, not on a dull and lifeless material

substance that lies behind primary and secondary qualities, but rather *on the territory of that Eternal Mind* . " . . . [T]he sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of 'reality' it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other." ³⁶

So, with God as the cause and support of all in his empiricism, is it proper to call Berkeley an empiricist? He does believe that knowledge comes from experience, that the mind begins in life as a *tabula rasa*, and that there is an external world (although not a corporeal world), and all of these are fundamental parts of the *historical, plain* method. Does it really make a difference to the empirical method that there is no such thing as matter or that existence apart from the mind is absurd? Berkeley argues that the only thing the mind can know is ideas, and therefore his purpose is to save man from needless speculation. Berkeley's intentions are good, and he is truer to the *historical, plain* method than Locke. His own downfall comes, however, when he tries to prove God's existence by way of empirical means. He is guilty of wandering from the standards of the empirical method to which he promised to remain faithful. The result is that Berkeley, like Locke, is an empiricist, but only to the extent that empiricism supports the philosophy he wants to put forth. The problem with God is that no amount of fancy words or logic games can suffice as proof for the existence of that which cannot prove itself. We remember that in empiricism, only what is immediately discoverable in experience counts as proof for the existence of anything. In Berkeley's case, we see that he has not remained faithful to this rule.

Chapter III

As we have seen in the two preceding parts of this essay, both Locke and Berkeley attempt to live up to the standards of the *historical, plain* method, and both begin to drift away from it when they realize the method will not support everything in their philosophies. It is really only Hume who is true to the empirical method, because he does not go beyond experience in an attempt to find greater certainty than can be found in experience, and because he understands that the method is only a way of measuring the certainty of knowledge, that it is incapable of accounting for everything in life. Both Locke and Berkeley try to use the method to cover all aspects of human existence, including our understanding of the meaning of mathematical entities. While Locke tries to prove that such things as matter, mathematics and morality are, each in their own way, self-evident, Hume simply admits that things like the abstract demonstrative sciences, i.e. logic, arithmetic, and geometry, have no bearing of matters of existence whatsoever. So, while Locke and Berkeley force upon the empirical method such things as material and immaterial substances which it is incapable of supporting, Hume does not expect the method to answer for anything that falls outside its limitations. Instead, I have found that it is Hume's treatment of what lies *closest* to man in the empirical realm that makes him the philosopher most faithful to the *historical, plain* method.

In the introduction to his *Treatise* Hume says all the sciences--*Logic, Morals, Criticism and Politics*--have some relation to human nature. Logic includes the faculty of reasoning and the nature of our ideas. Morals and criticism are concerned with the tastes and sentiments of man. Politics treats of the union of men in society. Various subgroups such as mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion, are other than man but are known by him and he judges what is true and false in these branches of knowledge. Natural religion treats of the nature of the divine but also of His disposition toward man and man's obligations. So, human nature becomes the "capital centre" of the sciences. It is Hume's idea that we need to develop a science of man, and to do so we should apply the experimental method. "[A]s the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation."¹ We must do what has been done to natural science in the study of man: begin with a close observation of man's mental processes and moral behavior, and ascertain principles and causes. Experiments done with man, however, will be different from those done, for example, in chemistry. Data will arise from introspection and observation of life and conduct. It is empirical data; there is no intuition of man's essence. We must use an inductive, not deductive, method. And, "[w]here experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension."²

In his *Enquiry* Hume says the science of human nature can be viewed by two kinds of philosophers: either man is an active being in the eyes of an observing philosopher, making the latter want to stimulate man to virtuous conduct; or, man is a reasoning being and one should concentrate on enlightening his understanding. The first type of philosopher (he that would see man as an active being) is "easy and obvious", while the second is "accurate and abstruse". Most men prefer the first type, although the second is requisite if the first is to possess any sure foundation. Yes, abstract and abstruse metaphysical speculation leads nowhere but, "[t]he only method of free learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that

it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate." ³ We cannot remain satisfied with yesteryear's achievements. "True metaphysics" will drive out false metaphysics; but it will also establish the science of man on a sure basis. And to attain this end it is worth taking trouble and pursuing an accurate, even comparatively abstruse, analysis.

Hume wants to take up where Locke left off: to determine the extent of human knowledge. Hume seems to be using his philosophy to answer Locke instead of Berkeley. He did this because, although he greatly respected Berkeley, he found that Locke was closer to the kind of empiricism that he himself wanted to put forth. By this I mean that Hume believes in the kind of external world that Locke supports, a world that is not composed of ideas or maintained by a God. Therefore, Hume wants to take Locke's philosophy, which is closer to his own, and modify it to suit his own needs.

Hume wants to discover the principles which govern moral judgments, as well as those which regulate the understanding. Hume is a moral philosopher and an epistemologist. All knowledge comes from experience. "Perceptions" are the mind's contents in general--its ideas and impressions. The former are the copies of faint images of impressions in thinking and reasoning; the latter are the immediate data of experience like sensations. If I look at a room I receive an impression of it. "When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other." ⁴ "Idea" here is equivalent to image. Just as Locke derived all knowledge from simple ideas, so Hume derives knowledge from impressions, the immediate data of experience. The only difference here between Locke and Hume is that Hume replaces Locke's ideas of sensation and reflection with ideas and impressions, as he found the latter to be closer to what he believed would be a precise empirical method.

Hume describes the difference between impressions and ideas in terms of vividness:

The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions* ; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. ⁵

But, [t]he most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation. ⁶

Later, Hume asserts that ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. But he does not qualify this. He only distinguishes between simple and complex perceptions, a distinction he applies to both impressions and ideas. The perception of a red patch, for example, is a simple perception, and the thought of a red patch is a simple idea. But if I look at a city from on high, I receive a complex impression of the city. Thinking back on the city will give me a complex idea. However, imagining a unicorn or a centaur is different, as they are ideas that cannot correspond to any impression.

So, not every idea corresponds to an impression. Yet the image of the unicorn or centaur can be broken down into simple ideas--complex turns simple. We ask, does every simple idea have a corresponding impression, and every simple impression a corresponding simple idea? Hume answers, "I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple

idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea." 7

Are impressions derived from ideas or ideas from impressions? We need only examine their order of appearance to answer this. Impressions seem to precede ideas in most cases. A child, for instance, needs to experience the impression of an orange before he can have and understand an idea of the fruit. However, according to Hume, there does seem to be an exception to this case. Hume describes the hypothetical case of a man who has seen all the colors of blue in the world except one. If all the different shades of that color, except that single one, be placed before the man, is it possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply that particular shade? Hume believes that he can.⁸ However, I have an objection to this proposition. I do not believe that it is possible for the mind to form any sort of mental image, faint or vivid, without an impression preceding it. If the missing color of blue has not been experienced, how can the mind create what it has never known? One could mix different shades of blue paint and produce a new color; however, even with the unmixed paint before him, one would not be able to picture the missing shade in his mind. Hume is allowing another source aside from pure sense experience to be a standard for knowledge. The only service this proposition does is to put doubt in the mind of the reader, making him wonder what else Hume considers a source of knowledge outside experience.

The following point should be added: impressions can be divided up into impressions of sensations and impressions of reflection. "The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas . . ." ⁹ If I have an impression of cold, accompanied by pain, a "copy" of this impression remains in my mind after the impression has ceased. The copy is called an idea and it can produce new impressions, which are impressions of reflection. Aversion and love are two examples. These again can be copied by the memory and imagination and become more ideas.

The analysis of the relation between impressions and ideas seems to be just a restatement of empiricism without innate ideas. But Hume uses the theory in a different way. Because it states

that the mind's ideas come only from a collection of particular qualities, the theory can be used to get rid of what he calls "all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them."¹⁰ Philosophers may use terms that signify no determinate ideas and possess no definite meaning. "When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without meaning or idea . . . , we need but inquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived* ? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion."¹¹

Does Hume's theory of impressions and ideas exclude the hypothesis of innate ideas? We need qualification here. If "innate" is taken as equivalent to "natural", "then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural . . ."¹² If by "innate" we mean contemporary with birth, the dispute whether there are innate ideas or not is frivolous; "nor is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth."¹³ But if by "innate" we mean copied from no precedent perception, "then may we assert that all our impressions are innate and our ideas not innate."¹⁴ Therefore, events and objects, regardless of experience, are considered from an *a priori* point of view, because no information prior to the immediate moment is valid to certainty or knowledge.¹⁵ Every moment we are starting anew. Obviously, Hume does not assert innate ideas in the way Locke rejects them. To say that impressions are innate is merely to say they are not copies of impressions; that is, they are not ideas in Hume's sense of the word.

How is the idea of substance derived? It is not derived from any impression of sensation--it is not a color, taste or sound, etc. The idea of substance must come from an impression of reflection. But impressions of reflection resolve into passions or emotions, neither of which constitutes substance. If substance comes neither from sensation nor from reflection, there can be no idea of substance. Hume says, therefore, that "the idea of a substance . . . is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection."¹⁶ Further, men who believe that qualities inhere in substance believe fiction. Here Hume accepts Berkeley's criticism of Locke's theory of substance. But he goes on to reject Berkeley's theory of spiritual substance. He extends the phenomenalist interpretation of things from bodies to souls or

minds. His general empiricist position points to a consistent phenomenalism, to an analysis of all complex ideas to impressions, and he is involved in an attempt to treat spiritual substance in the same way as material substance.

When discussing "relation" in his *Treatise*, Hume comes up with two senses of the word. The word may be used to signify quality or qualities, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination and the one naturally introduces the other. The "qualities" are resemblance, contiguity and the causal relation; Hume calls them *natural relations*. In this kind of relation, ideas are connected by man's natural force of association, so that the one tends naturally to recall the other. "Relation" can be used in the philosophic sense, too. We can compare any objects we wish provided there is some similarity of quality between them. In the philosophical relation no natural force impels the mind; it chooses to act of its own will. There are seven types of philosophical relation, *viz. resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation.*¹⁷ There is some overlapping between natural and philosophical relations, but this is not an oversight on Hume's part. He explains that objects have to resemble each other to be compared: resemblance is a relation without which no philosophical relation can exist. But it does not follow that every resemblance produces an association of ideas. The idea of a material thing, for example, is general enough to include a great number of objects, although it does not *as such* lead the mind by the force of association to any particular thing.

As for Hume's theory of causation, I postpone discussion of it for the present. However, it is worth mentioning at this point that his view of causation, considered as a philosophical relation, is reducible to such relations of space and time as contiguity, temporal succession and constant conjunction. There is no necessary connexion between ideas; there is only factual spatio-temporal relation. So, we cannot proceed beyond experience--there is no inferring transcendental causes from observed effects. In causation there is an inseparable connexion between ideas; but this element must be explained subjectively, with the aid of the principles of association.

Hume agrees with Berkeley's position against abstract general ideas, and he proposes to confirm it by some further arguments of his own. First, abstract ideas are individual or particular within themselves. 1) "*[T]he mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each.*"¹⁸ For instance, the precise length of a line is not distinguishable from the line itself. We cannot form a general idea of a line without any length at all; nor can we form the general idea of a line possessing all the possible lengths. 2) Every impression is determinate and definite. 3) Everything which exists must be individual. There is no triangle that is not particular with particular characteristics. Hume's view follows from his conception of idea and of their relation to impressions. If the idea is an image or copy, it must be particular. So, there are no abstract general ideas. But, what are called "abstract ideas" can be general in their representation. When we find a resemblance among objects, we apply a common name to them all, all the while noting their similarities and disregarding their differences.

"All objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas*, and *matters of fact*."¹⁹ The first includes the sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably certain. They depend only on the mind and have no jurisdiction in nature or worldly experience. Matters of fact are ascertained in a different manner. They do depend on experience, and are informative about the external world. "*That the sun will not rise tomorrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."²⁰ Hume does not mean that it is untrue to say the sun will rise tomorrow: he means that no logical contradiction is involved in saying the sun will not rise. We do not have grounds for assurance that the sun will rise like we have assurance that $2+2=4$.

In this section we shall be concerned with relations of ideas. Of the seven philosophical relations, only four depend solely on ideas: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. The first three of these "are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration."²¹ As we are concerned with demonstrative reasoning we are left with proportions in quantity or number, namely, mathematics. Mathematical propositions assert relations between ideas and ideas only, and are independent of questions about existence.

Hume's account of mathematics is rationalist and non-empiricist, as he maintains that the relations asserted are necessary. The truth of mathematical propositions needs no confirmation from experience. Hume does not say mathematical ideas are innate in Locke's sense of the word. But he does say that the truth of a proposition is independent of man's daily experiences. Experience cannot be used to prove or disprove statements of number. To say that $2+2=4$ is not to say anything about existent things: the truth of the statement depends simply on the meanings of the terms.

From what impression(s) is the idea of causation derived? No quality of those things which we call "causes" can be the origin of the idea, for we cannot discover any quality which is common to them all. "The idea, then, of causation must be derived from some *relation* among objects; and that relation we must now endeavor to discover."²² The first relation Hume mentions is contiguity. Whatever objects are considered as causes or effects are contiguous. Things can be immediately contiguous, as A to B, or not immediately contiguous, as A to Z. What Hume rules out is action at a distance in the proper sense of the term:

Two distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be linked by a chain of causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist.²³

Hume speaks of causation as cause and effect always being contiguous, either immediately or mediately. But he does not commit himself to saying that the relation of contiguity is necessarily essential to the causal relation. He says we can take it that this is the case "till we can find a more proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction."²⁴ Later Hume discusses spatial contiguity, that it is not essential to the idea of causation. "A moral reflection cannot be placed on the right or on the left hand of a passion, nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or a square figure. These objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them."²⁵ Passions enter into causal relations but are not spatially contiguous with other things. So, spatial contiguity is not indispensable to causal relations.

The second relation Hume discusses is temporal priority. Cause must precede effect. Experience confirms this. Effects cannot be contemporary with causes. Hume does not think contiguity and temporal succession more important than necessary connexion. "Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above mentioned."²⁶ The role of necessary connexion is important to Hume's concept of experience, which I will explain later on in this paper.

How does the idea of necessary connexion arise? Hume thinks it best to discuss two important questions first:

First, For what reason we pronounce it *necessary*, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause?

Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must

necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that *inference* we draw from the one to the other, and of the *belief* we repose in it ?²⁷

The maxim that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence is neither intuitively certain nor demonstrable. Hume challenges anyone to show how it is intuitively certain that what begins to exist does have a cause. And if we can conceive a beginning of existence in separation from the idea of a cause, "the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause."²⁸ Hume proceeds to refute certain formulations of the pretended demonstration of the principle that everything which begins to be does so through some cause. People generally believe that things cannot cause themselves, nor come from nothing. Hume's main criticism of this is that it is begging the question to presuppose anything that begins to exist must have a cause.

If the principle is neither intuitively certain nor demonstrable, our belief in it must arise from experience and observation. Here Hume drops the subject and goes to answer why we believe that a particular cause needs a particular effect.

Causal inference is not the fruit of intuitive knowledge of essences. "There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an inference would amount to knowledge and would imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are separable, it is evident there can be no impossibility of that kind."²⁹ For example, we do not intuit the essence of flame and see its effects as logically necessary consequences. It is only by experience that we can infer the existence of one object from another. We must experience two objects together, note their order of contiguity and succession, and soon we will call one *cause* and the other *effect*. We always tacitly presuppose a uniformity of action in nature. Hume does not mean we ought not to assume such a principle--to do this would be to adopt a scepticism unnecessarily. He just wishes to say that there is no certainty in assuming nature to continue uniformly as it has done in the past. "The supposition, that the future resembles

the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects, to which we have been accustomed." ³⁰ Reason is not the guide of life but custom. This alone determines the mind to suppose the future conformable to the past.

Hume also discusses the idea of constant conjunction. The statement that it is experience of constant conjunction which leads us to assert particular causal connexions does not answer Hume's question, From what impressions is the idea of necessary connexion derived? To see objects together implies no necessary connexion. "From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only." ³¹ So, there either is no idea of necessary connexion, or it is derived from some subjective source. Hume adopts the second alternative.

If the idea of necessary connexion is derived from a subjective source, it must come from some impression of reflection. It cannot be from the relation of the will to its effects: "[T]he will being here considered as a cause, has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect." ³² We must look, therefore, to another solution. To give rise to the idea of necessary connexion, the repetition of similar instances of constant conjunction, "must either *discover* or *produce* something new, which is the source of that idea." ³³ Repetition does not make us discover anything new in the conjoined objects, nor does it produce any new qualities in the objects themselves. But observation of repetition does produce a new impression in the mind. "For after we have observed the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant . . ." ³⁴ So, the propensity, produced by custom, is an impression, and the idea of necessary connexion is its reflection or image in our minds.

Causation can now be defined more accurately. Causation considered as a philosophical relation is "[a]n object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those objects, that resemble

the latter." ³⁵ And, causation considered as a natural relation is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other." ³⁶ It is to be noted that "though causation be a *philosophical* relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet it is only so far as it is a *natural* relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it." ³⁷

Hume has thus answered why we conclude that particular causes must necessarily have particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to another. It is couched in psychological terms. The mind observes instances of constant conjunction, which produce a custom or associative link, whereby the mind naturally passes from one impression to the next. I experience the impression of a flame and I immediately have the idea of heat; I can pass beyond experience and observation.

And what of the theory that whatever begins to exist must do so through a cause? Custom makes us expect a cause. Hume remarks that in view of the resulting definitions of *cause*, "we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object." ³⁸ We cannot demonstrate the truth of the principle in question; yet, Hume realizes it is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause. Our belief in this principle must be due then to custom. Hume goes on to discuss chance. Not believing in chance is to believe that every event has a cause. And to believe this is, for Hume, to believe that every cause is a necessary or determining cause. To say every event has a cause is a maxim "formed" by philosophers and the result of custom.

Hume says there can be only one kind of cause. "For as our idea of efficacy is derived from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observed, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind." ³⁹ Further, there is one kind of cause and one kind of necessity. The distinction between physical and moral necessity lacks any real foundation. "It is the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with *chance* ." ⁴⁰

Hume devotes considerable time to the analysis of causality, as it plays an important role in the sciences and in human life in general. The great merit of this analysis is his attempt to combine empiricism with causation. When we say X caused Y we mean more than X preceded Y temporally and was spatially contiguous with it. He confronts the difference and tries to solve it along empiricist lines.

As we have seen, the uniformity of nature is not demonstrable by reason but the object of belief. So, we do not really have knowledge of the uniformity of nature. Neither experience nor reason justifies our beliefs about the future. However, Hume realizes that belief is very important in life. In his view, as belief "does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defined, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION." ⁴¹ For example, when we infer the existence of one thing from that of another, we pass from the impression of one object to the "lively" idea of another; and it is this liveliness of the idea that is characteristic of belief. "An idea assented to *feels* different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior *force*, or *vivacity*, or *solidity*, or *firmness*, or *steadiness*." ⁴²

We have always been told that the earth is round. Belief can be generated by education and so by ideas; and Hume admits this. So, "[w]hen I am convinced of any principle, it is only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence." ⁴³ All our reasonings concerning cause and effect are derived entirely from custom. How, then, can we decide between rational and irrational beliefs? Many beliefs are the result of education, and some of them are irrational. The way to cure ourselves is to have recourse to experience, to test those beliefs.

But a further difficulty arises. Hume speaks as though custom *ought* to dominate in human life. Yet he also speaks as if experience must be our guide. Perhaps it can be answered in this way. Hume says there are certain fundamental customary beliefs which are essential to human life--belief in the continuous and independent existence of bodies, and the belief that everything that begins to be has a cause. These beliefs ought to dominate if human life is to be possible. The more

superficial beliefs are not inevitable or necessary and can be tested and altered through experience.

Hume does not deny the existence of bodies apart from our knowledge of them, but we cannot prove they do exist. We can only question the cause that makes us believe there are bodies outside our perception. The senses cannot tell us; they do not perceive beyond phenomena. We may think we perceive our own bodies; but, "properly speaking, it is not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses"⁴⁴ Also, reason does not induce us to believe in the continuous and distinct existence of bodies. We cannot rationally justify our beliefs about bodies; nor can we infer the existence of objects from perceptions. Such an inference would be a causal inference. And for it to be valid we need to observe the constant conjunction of the objects with the perceptions. And this we cannot do, for we cannot escape our realm of perceptions.

So, our belief in the independent existence of bodies must be due, not to the senses, nor reason, nor the understanding, but to the imagination. But, what is it that persuades the imagination of the existence of bodies? Hume mentions two features, *constancy* and *coherence*. Trees, mountains and rocks, for example, suggest constancy of being, though I might close my eyes to them for awhile. Here we have constantly recurring similar impressions. Bodies do change in position and quality, but even in change, there is coherence. "When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustomed in other instances to see a like alteration produced in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy."⁴⁵ The impression of a mountain will be more constant than the impression of a fire, but both impressions have some regular pattern of coherence. The imagination tries to "smooth over" our interrupted impressions. ". . . [T]he imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and . . . carries on its course without any new impulse."⁴⁶ Once the mind sees a uniformity among impressions it tries to render it as complete as possible. This supposition affords us greater regularity than is provided by the senses. But, though coherence may give rise to the supposition of the continuous existence of bodies, the idea of coherency is needed to explain our supposition of

their independence of our perceptions. We disguise or remove interruptions and differences in perceptions by supposing the perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible.⁴⁷

Philosophy, however, makes us see the fallacy of this supposition. Reason tells us perceptions do not exist independent of our perceiving. Philosophy, therefore, distinguishes between perceptions and objects, the former being interrupted and dependent while the latter exist continually and independently. But, this theory has its own problems. It involves postulating a new set of perceptions. We cannot conceive of objects except in terms of perceptions. Hence, if we postulate objects as well as perceptions, we merely reduplicate the latter and at the same time ascribe to them attributes, namely, uninterruptedness and independence, which do not belong to perceptions. The upshot of this examination is that there is no rational justification for our belief in the continued and independent existence of bodies. Yet, we cannot eradicate this belief. To be sure, "whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment, . . . an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world."⁴⁸ Hume does not recommend the theory that certain qualities (primary) are objective while others (secondary) are subjective. On the contrary, he maintains that "[i]f colors, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possessed of a real, continued, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on."⁴⁹

According to Hume, the problem of minds is not so complicated as the problem of bodies. "The intellectual world, though involved in infinite obscurities, is not perplexed with any such contradictions, as those we have discovered in the natural. What is known concerning it, agrees with itself; and what is unknown, we must be contented to leave so."⁵⁰ He points out that other philosophers promise to diminish our ignorance concerning material and immaterial substances, but that they are guilty of running us into contradictions. Therefore, Hume wants to ask those philosophers in a few words, "*What they mean by substance and inhesion?*" Hume treats the immateriality of soul first: 1) Have we any idea of substance? If so, what is the impression which produces this idea? (We have no idea.) 2) What is meant by "inhesion"? "Inhesion in something is supposed to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of

inhesion."⁵¹ Perceptions cannot inhere in a body. To do so they would have to be present locally. And it does not follow that perceptions can inhere in an immaterial substance. "That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists of parts."⁵² But what does it mean to say that an extended perception can *inhere* in an immaterial substance? It is an impossible relation, and if it is said that perceptions must inhere in something, it is begging the question. In truth, an object can exist and yet exist nowhere, "and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner."⁵³

As for soul, Hume concludes that the substance of soul is absolutely unintelligible. We can make no sense of it. But if there is no substance, whether extended or unextended, which can be called "soul", what of personal identity? Hume denies we have any idea of self as distinct from our perceptions. There is no permanent state of self-identity. Self is derived from impressions: yet, "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same . . . since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable."⁵⁴ So, there can be no idea of self; all perceptions are distinguishable and we can discover no self apart from them.

In the *Enquiry* Hume puts what he has to say about God into the mouth of an Epicurean friend who delivers an imaginary speech to the Athenians. The speaker says that religious philosophers "indulge a rash curiosity in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinious inquiry."⁵⁵ He then remarks that

. . . the chief or sole argument for a divine existence . . . is derived from the order of nature . . . You allow, that this is an argument drawn

from effects to causes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences. ⁵⁶

What are these consequences? 1) Ascribe to the cause the qualities which are required for producing the effect. 2) Infer only the effects immediately known. It is not possible to infer that a cause possesses more qualities than are presently conceived. It may possess other attributes; but we cannot know this. Knowledge about God is uncertain, "because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience." ⁵⁷ We can establish a causal relation only when we observe constant conjunction. But we cannot observe God at all, and natural phenomena remain what they are regardless of the explanatory hypothesis we choose to adopt.

In the *Dialogues*, I believe it is Philo that expresses Hume's attitude towards our knowledge of God's existence and nature:

If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence*: if this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: if it afford no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: and if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain,

philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and believe that the arguments, on which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it? ⁵⁸

Here we are reduced to the simple proposition that cause(s) of order in the world might bear a remote analogy to human intelligence. No more can be said. No affirmation can be made about the moral qualities of the "cause or causes". "True religion" is reduced, therefore, to a theoretical statement of probability. Man tends to believe that the world shows evidence of design, and that it is possible that the cause(s) of phenomena, whatever they may be, bear a sort of analogy to intelligence. But in the long run, the world is an inscrutable mystery and we cannot have any certain knowledge of ultimate causes.

What is the reality and extent of our knowledge, according to Hume? This is a difficult question to answer because Hume does not place human knowledge within certain standards as Locke and Berkeley do. Hume is more interested in showing us what we cannot know than what we can expect to know. And the upshot of his entire philosophy is that we cannot prove that we have certain knowledge of anything. For instance, Hume is certain that an external world exists, but it is "an existence distinct from mind and perception." ⁵⁹ Also,

It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. ⁶⁰

We are to realize that any kind of knowledge, regardless of our familiarity with it, cannot be considered certain. Hume reduces knowledge to immediate experience; and yet he realizes that he

would be guilty of skepticism if he were to claim that this and no more is what man can know. Excessive skepticism is to be avoided, for "no durable good can ever result from it."⁶¹ Therefore, the only thing we can do is realize our limitations.

Hume says there is no known connexion between sensible ideas and powers of bodies, that events seem conjoined but are never connected, and that the union of soul with body is mysterious. He discusses necessary connexion and cause and effect to great lengths and shows that it is only by habit that we assume necessary connexion between conjoined events, or that we expect the future to be like the past. It is custom, or instinct, that makes us believe we really know what effects will follow particular causes. However, although we cannot expect certain knowledge from custom or instinct, both are necessary to the existence and subsistence of our species, and we employ them much more than we do reason:

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life.⁶²

Hume realizes that the science of quantity and number has a kind of certainty that goes beyond experience; and yet he chooses to uphold custom and instinct as the strongest influence in human life. Absolute demonstrable truths, regardless of the amount of certainty they can offer, are empty and devoid of information about existence. Hume reprimands anyone who tries to exalt reason over experience, abstract elements of natural philosophy such as time and extension, or prove God's existence by arguing from analogy. While there is an abstract reasoning concerning quantity and

number that finds certainty in the mind, all other experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence must be founded on experience. Even knowledge of real existence and matter of fact, beyond the testimony of the senses, or the records of memory, is founded on the relation of cause and effect, or experience.

So, how has the *historical, plain* method changed under Hume's control? Hume picks up where both Locke and Berkeley left off. He uses the external world in Locke's philosophy because it more closely fits his idea of the empirical world than does Berkeley's world. Yet Hume also shares some of Berkeley's theories, such as the rejection of abstract ideas and the belief that both primary and secondary qualities exist in the mind and not in the objects themselves. But Hume does not stop here. He further refines the method, modifying it to such a point that he seems to have covered every angle of human knowledge. His purpose is to prove that the faculty of reason is not deserving of the praise it has received for so long, that it has really only served to turn men into skeptics. Of course, a certain amount of skepticism is good if we stay within the proper bounds. However, "all human life must perish, were [the skeptics'] principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence."⁶³ Therefore, Hume would much prefer that custom be the guiding factor in man's life, for "it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is so slow in its operations."⁶⁴ I believe it is this near exaltation of *human experience* that makes Hume the philosopher most faithful to the empirical method. Though he has had to reduce the method to little more than knowledge from immediate experience, by doing this he has strengthened the *historical, plain* method many times over.

Conclusion

We began our inquiry into the meaning of the theory of empiricism by taking a brief look at a few ways empiricism has been used in the past. We soon centered around Locke, Berkeley and Hume who held that all knowledge is based on experience. We found that to establish this general conviction the empirical philosophers employed a method, called by Locke the *historical, plain* method, which is a retrospective procedure of finding evidence for our beliefs by looking back to the original source of our ideas. They claimed that we can know the limits and scope of human knowledge by using such a procedure. The predominating purpose of the empiricist in advocating the retrospective method was to free man of needless metaphysical speculation. We found, however, that the empiricists, in their attempt to establish an empirical basis for knowledge by such a method, were faced from the start with the problem of accounting for the derivation of non-sensory concepts and the exactness of mathematical truths. Either they had to force all non-sensory concepts on to the same level of certainty as sense-data and reduce all truths to empirical truths, or they had to admit that not all truths are empirical. We saw how Locke was led astray by his exaltation of mathematics and morality, his abstractions, and by the way he allowed man's intuition to act as the basis for certainty in knowledge. Also, we saw that Berkeley mistakenly tried to prove God's existence by empirical means. We found that, in the end, it was

Hume who remained most faithful to the *historical, plain* method because he did not attempt to account for anything outside of immediate experience.

The title of this thesis is *The Use and Abuse of the Historical, plain method*. The reason why I included the word "abuse" is to try to stress the different approaches one can take toward the empirical method. As we discovered in the philosophies of Locke and Berkeley, it is possible for rationalism to work with empiricism, without the two being diametrically opposed to one another; one sets the stage for the other. In Hume's philosophy, however, rationalism is almost entirely non-existent, appearing only now and again when he discusses probability, contiguity, necessary connexion, and so on; in these cases Hume tells us that, although the extent of certain knowledge is strictly limited to immediate experience, it is the nature of the mind to speculate and look for connexions among chains of events. Therefore, when he describes the rational elements in the mind, it is not because he wants to put certainty on them, but only because he cannot ignore them.

However, I do question the reason why Locke and Berkeley allow even the possibility of self-evident propositions when they initially intended to be true to immediate experience alone. The answer to this is to be found in the historical setting in which Locke and Berkeley lived and worked. They were preceded by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, who all tended to emphasize the mathematical element, to take mathematical certainty as their ideal, and to formulate their criterion of truth and reality in terms of the principle of contradiction. This quite affected Locke; although he emphasized sense-perception and the real world for him was the "here-and-now world" of the concrete and the practical, he did share the passion for the power of reason that arose during the seventeenth century. Berkeley was also much affected by his times. He was a deeply religious man and the conflict between the scientific and the religious views of life troubled him. His aim was to rid the world of the concept of a thoughtless material substance, and to prove that God is the only *logical* cause, provider and support of all. However, Berkeley's troubles are couched in the word "logical", as the only proof of God's existence can be found in logical, and not empirical, terms.

So, we find that the *historical, plain* method was born into times in which reason was being exalted as a sure basis for progress and improvement, and it was only after years of use and abuse that the empirical method found its proper place in the philosophy of Hume. It could not have survived in any philosophy that allowed a rational method of thought equal to or even more

important than itself. And, that it is possible to make the *historical, plain* method serve as a starting point for speculation is not a valid argument for turning a rational philosopher into an empiricist. The question inevitably comes down to, To what will one make himself a faithful servant? Without doubt, Locke is disposed to follow reason. If he were at all the empiricist he intended to be, he would have based all the certainty of knowledge on experience and not on intuition. Further, he would not have clung to moral and mathematical propositions even though the immediate objects of thought (ideas) could not be empirically validated. And Berkeley, put quite simply, follows an abstraction. Although he is successful in clearing much of the speculation from Locke's philosophy, he falls a victim of his own criticism when he tries to assert the existence of God. It is Hume alone that is the only true devotee to empiricism; through his refusal to search for certainty outside of immediate experience and in the way he nearly exalts human experience, Hume is the best representative of the *historical, plain* method.

Notes

Introduction

¹ "Empiricism," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* , 1967 ed. p. 499.

² *Encyclopedia* pp. 499-500.

³ *Philosophical Commentaries* , edited by A A Luce and T E Jessop, in *The Works of George Berkeley* (London: Nelson, 1948), Vol. I, (312) p. 39.

⁴ Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (354) p. 42.

⁵ *An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding* , edited by Richard Taylor (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 317.

⁶ Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (317) p. 39.

⁷ Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (393) p. 47.

⁸ Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (368) p. 44.

⁹ *A Treatise of Human Nature* , edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p. 175.

Chapter I

¹ *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Richard Taylor (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 7.

² Locke, *Essay* , p. 8.

³ Locke, *Essay* , p. 62.

⁴ Locke, *Essay* , p. 15.

⁵ I have used quotation marks here because Locke habitually speaks of how the senses "convey" information into the mind; I find this to be vague talk. Refer to page 10 of the *Essay* for examples.

⁶ Locke, *Essay* , p. 23.

⁷ Locke, *Essay* , p. 92.

⁸ Locke, *Essay* , p. 21.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Locke, *Essay* , p. 31.

¹¹ Locke, *Essay* , p. 20

¹² Locke, *Essay* , p. 93.

¹³ Locke, *Essay* , p. 95.

¹⁴ Locke, *Essay* , p. 22.

¹⁵ Locke, *Essay* , p. 27.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Locke, *Essay* , p. 54.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Locke, *Essay* , pp. 59-60.

²⁰ Locke, *Essay* , p. 59.

²¹ Locke, *Essay* , p. 102.

²² Locke, *Essay* , p. 63.

²³ Locke, *Essay* , p. 58.

²⁴ Locke, *Essay* , p. 36.

²⁵ Locke, *Essay* , p. 56.

²⁶ Locke, *Essay* , p. 75.

²⁷ Locke, *Essay* , p. 85.

²⁸ Locke, *Essay* , p. 78.

²⁹ Locke, *Essay* , p. 79.

³⁰ Locke, *Essay* , p. 81.

³¹ Locke, *Essay* , p. 82.

³² Locke, *Essay* , p. 83.

³³ Locke, *Essay* , p. 53.

³⁴ Locke, *Essay* , p. 93.

³⁵ Locke, *Essay* , p. 95.

³⁶ Locke, *Essay* , p. 23.

³⁷ Locke, *Essay* , p. 133.

Chapter II

¹ *Philosophical Commentaries* , edited by A A Luce and T E Jessop, in *The Works of George Berkeley* , (London: Nelson, 1948) Vol. 1, (717) p. 87.

² *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, edited by Richard Taylor (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 148.

³ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 142.

⁴ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 143.

⁵ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 138.

⁶ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 197.

⁷ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 199.

⁸ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 203.

⁹ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 144.

¹⁰ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 152.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (378) p. 45.

¹³ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 154.

¹⁴ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 152.

¹⁵ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 154.

¹⁶ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 155.

¹⁷ Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* , (807) p. 97.

¹⁸ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 164.

¹⁹ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 165.

²⁰ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 163.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 208.

²³ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 210.

²⁴ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 162.

²⁵ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 187.

²⁶ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 166.

²⁷ Berkeley, *Principles*, p. 180.

²⁸ *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* , edited by Richard Taylor (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), pp. 256-57.

²⁹ Berkeley, *Dialogues* , p. 294.

³⁰ Berkeley, *Dialogues* , p. 297.

³¹ Berkeley, *Dialogues* , p. 294.

³² Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 151.

³³ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 160.

³⁴ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 161.

³⁵ Berkeley, *Principles*, p. 162.

³⁶ Berkeley, *Principles* , p. 164.

Chapter III

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature* , edited by Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p. XX.

² Hume, *Treatise* , p. XXiii.

³ *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* , edited by Richard Taylor (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 312.

⁴ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 3.

⁵ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 1.

⁶ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 316.

⁷ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 3.

⁸ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 319.

⁹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 7.

¹⁰ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 319.

¹¹ Hume, *Enquiry* , pp. 319-320.

¹² Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 320 (note).

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 326.

¹⁶ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 16.

¹⁷ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 69.

¹⁸ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 18.

¹⁹ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 322.

²⁰ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 322-23.

²¹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 70.

²² Hume, *Treatise* , p. 75.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 236.

²⁶ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 77.

²⁷ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 78.

²⁸ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 80.

²⁹ Hume, *Treatise* , pp. 86-7.

³⁰ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 134.

³¹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 88.

³² Hume, *Treatise* , p. 632.

³³ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 163.

³⁴ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 165.

³⁵ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 170.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 94.

³⁸ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 172.

³⁹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 171.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 96.

⁴² Hume, *Treatise* , p. 629.

⁴³ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 103.

⁴⁴ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 191.

⁴⁵ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 195.

⁴⁶ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 198.

⁴⁷ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 199.

⁴⁸ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 218.

⁴⁹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 228.

⁵⁰ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 232.

⁵¹ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 234.

⁵² Hume, *Treatise* , p. 239.

⁵³ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 235.

⁵⁴ Hume, *Treatise* , p. 251.

⁵⁵ Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 407.

56 *Ibid.*

57 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 412.

58 Hume, *Dialogues* , p. 516.

59 Hume, *Treatise* --1, iv. 2.

60 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 360.

61 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 426.

62 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 345.

63 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 426.

64 Hume, *Enquiry* , p. 345.

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